Although
under the autocratic regime of president Erdogan, Turkey expected to
receive its F-35 fighter aircraft. According to plan the first plan
would be delivered June 21 and stationed in September 2019 in
Turkey's Malatya province which borders Iran, Iraq and Syria. But
remarkably the program is now under fire in the US.
The
detention of the
American pastor Andrew Craig Brunson,
the role of Turkey in fighting the Kurdish YPG in Syria (an ally
against IS) and most prominently the
acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defence system
pushed US-Turkish relations to the edge.
The
F-35 plays in central role in the debate. It is part of the 2019
defence budget deliberations (NDAA 2019) in
which the US House of Representatives stated:
"Requires DOD to provide Congress with a report
on the impact that increasing strains on the U.S.-Turkey
relationship, caused by provocative actions taken by the Turkish
military
deliveries to Turkey will be frozengovernment over the past year,
will have on all U.S. military and diplomatic activities currently
conducted in Turkey, including joint operation of the F-35 and other
military platforms. Prohibits DOD from taking any action to execute
the delivery of a foreign military sale for major defense equipment
under section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act to Turkey, until the
report is complete."
When this amendment
will be adopted, until within 60 days following the enactment of the
law the report is submitted to the relevant Committee of Congress. A
US procurement official, cited
by Defense News, fears the Bill would "kill all
US-Turkish procurement business in the several years ahead."
And so do Turkish commentators. The CEO of Turkish
defence firm ASELSAN stated
recently that the whole F-35 program
will collapse if the U.S. blocks deliveries of the fighter jets to
Turkey. An annalist with the Turkish C4 defence magazine said:
"The US will shoot itself in the foot, it would definitely
harm the entire project."
Also
a Bill
was introduced by two Republicans and one Democrat senator to
“limit the transfer of
F–35 aircraft to Turkey”, because Turkey
degrades NATO security by acquiring the S-400 air defence system from
Russia a country under US-sanctions. And "has wrongfully or
unlawfully detaining one or more United States citizens",
referring to pater Brunson who is accused of being a Gülen
supporter.
The reasons for the
debate is clearly NATO and US domestic affairs, not Turkish human
rights, peace and security considerations. And it is predictable the
F-35 cooperation with Turkey will not be blocked. The F-35 is the
largest defence program ever. According to the US
General Accounting Office (GAO) worth $400 billion in new build
fighter planes and $1,000 billion in overhaul and maintenance for the
next 60 years; an enormous figure contributing to the incredibly high
US military expenditure.
The F-35 is often
regarded a US program, but the US has tried to get as many
international partners as possible. The UK is most prominent,
followed by the Netherlands and Italy, the second tier participants
But also Australia, Canada, Denmark, Israel, Japan, the Republic
of Korea and Turkey are part of the program. Several Turkish
companies participate (see
earlier Explosive Stuff blog) and according to the
Daily Sabah, a pro-government paper, Turkish firms expect to make
a profit of $US 12 billion from it. A branch of Dutch Fokker Elmo in
Izmir for example will produce a major share of the Electrical Wiring
& Interconnection System (EWIS) for the F-35 engine (the F135),
according the
F-35 program website.
But how can the
European Union contributers to the F-35 program reconcile with it's
Common
Postion on arms exports? Is seem Turkey fits many criteria not to
export arms to a country:
Criteria 2 states: Respect for human rights in the
country of final destination as well as respect by that country of
international humanitarian law.
Criteria 3 states: Internal situation in the country
of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or
armed conflicts.
Criteria 4 states: Member States shall deny an export
licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would
use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively
against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.
Criteria 6 states: Behaviour of the buyer country
with regard to the international community, as regards in particular
its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect
for international law.
F-35 deliveries
of many EU states however fall under a so called General Export
License. This kind of license was introduced to facilitate arms
exports to NATO, EU, and allied countries (Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and Switzerland). The licenses provide general export
permission for a limited number of countries and items. SIPRI
described General Licenses as a "shift
to a reduction in licensing requirements for less sensitive exports."
But fighter plane (components) to a country using
fighter planes regularly against its own population and against
neighbouring states can hardly be considered non-sensitive.
The
UK has recently updated its Open
General Export Licence (OGEL) "to
export or transfer goods, software or technology for the Joint Strike
Fighter (F-35 Lightning II) (JSF) Programme from the United Kingdom
to any of the destinations or countries listed in this licence"
such as Israel and Turkey. The Dutch General
Export License for the F-35 (Regeling
Algemene Vergunning NL009) is less
clear and refers to parties adjusted to approved agreements in the
framework of the F-35 Lightning II program, without naming them, but
Turkey is surely one of them. Recently
the Dutch export authorities stopped several F-16 deliveries, but
it must be feared the F-35 faces a less restrictive policy.
Ankara
is spreeing misery by its police and detention centers, but also by
its air force. A closer look on the biggest weapon program in the
history of mankind is needed, also when it only concerns components.
When the entire F-35 project hings on Turkish participation, as
Turkish commentators suggest, it may be doubted if the program ever
took on board the arms export principles of the EU. Considering
Turkish aggression against civilians and neighbouring countries the
impossible should be possible here, and F-35 exports to Turkey should
indeed be stopped. To substantiate the EU Common Position on arms
exports it is necessary.
