On January 22, 2019 Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron signed the Treaty of Aachen (Aachener Vertrag/Traité d'Aix-la-Chapelle).
Article 4 deals with internal and external security and defence
cooperation, including military industrial issues. Berlin and Paris will
intensify common defence programs to promote and consolidate the
European defence technological and industrial base. As close as possible
on the basis of mutual trust. Both countries will develop a common
approach to arms exports in joint projects and establish the
Franco-German Defence and Security Council as the political governing
body.
It is not clear which defence programs are meant in the text. But
annalists mention a next generation military fighter plane, drones and
tanks. The fighter aircraft and the so-called European main battle tank
together “form the backbone of Franco-German defence ambitions, with
tens of billions of dollars at stake,” according to the US military
publication Defense News. Spain recently joined the fighter program, but Airbus warned that the UK
will be left out of the project if the UK leaves the single market and
customs union of the European Union. On top of plane, tank and drone
there are many more common projects, such as the A400M military
transport plane, the Tiger attack helicopters, the NH90 transport
helicopter and the European surveillance drone (Eurodrone MALE) with
large equipment transfers from at least France to Germany and visa
versa.
The French have no happy memories on expensive common European programs. A report by the National Audit (Cour des Comptes) recommended
to keep projects limited to “two, or even three States sharing the same
wish to invest sustainably.” The French Audit office also proposes to
“launch [no] new defence equipment projects without first ensuring that
the associated budget programming is realistic.” The multi billion
European Defence Fund (EDF) may be used
for streamlining common projects when it will get the proposed €13
billion, divided into €4.1 billion for collaborative defence research
and €8.9 billion to co-financing member states’ prototype development.
The French national audit office recommend also to “promote
Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) as the delegated
project manager.” OCCAR is one of the benefissiaries of the European Defence Fund
and already involved in the Tiger helicopter, the MALE drone and the
A400M plane. In that case a fund filled by the remittances of national
governments would be used to finance a German-Franco project that
competes with industries of smaller nations. It is difficult to see this
happen without opposition of other OCCAR participants.
The Guardian wrote on the Aachen treaty that it is a snub to other EU-members.
Interest of the Franco-German defence industry is not the same as
defence industry interests of Europe as a whole. The Dutch center right
daily Telegraaf
reported how the Dutch choice for Dutch/Swedish submarines is not only a
financial and technological adventure, but may also sour the relations
with Paris and Berlin. Dutch Damen shipyard has already problems with
the Naval Group in Romania (see previous blogs) and is also competing with Italian Leonardo in Brazil.
When the Aachen Treaty is a threat for the relations with Washington
and the US defence industry, EU-members will try to frustrate its
proceedings. The US was the second biggest destination
for military sales of EU-member states after Saudi Arabia in the period
1998-2017. Creating a stronger European Union defence industrial base
from a German French perspective gives the impression the big are trying to squeeze the small.
The plans for the a next-generation fighter are an affront to Italy and
will weaken the European Union, according to the head of an Italian
defence industry association in Defense News. But even between Germany and France one may doubt how deep the agreement is.
“Rub away the rhetoric and you're not left with much,” the Irish Times
stated and continued: “The text includes pledges everyone knows will
come to nothing - France promises to support Germany's efforts to secure
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, for example. The mutual
defence clause is a largely decorative flourish given that both
countries are already bound by article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty.”
Added to this there is also a common European arms export policy. It is
not strictly implemented across the Union. But it exists and also here
there nothing new, so far.
Arms may be developed to create a stronger European position
vis-a-vis the US and China, but weapons will be exported to countries
outside Europe to get more return on investments. The European Commission recently summarised
the European arms export policy in answer on questions around sales to
the Saudi's: “the handling of authorisations for the export of military
technology and equipment is primarily a task for the EU Member States.
It is also their responsibility to assess the risks prior to authorising
any arms transaction.” It is hard to overlook the difference between
the French and German interpretation of the EU Common Position on arms
export controls. The logic behind a remark on the Euroactiv website
is obvious: “Not defining a common export rule would mean putting
certain common industrial projects at risk,” and is food for friction.
Recently the differences were most visible in the reactions on the
murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The Irish Times
in reaction to Aachen Treaty stated: “If Paris and Berlin are serious
about a common stance on arms exports, there's a gaping chasm to bridge;
France opted against following Germany's lead in halting arms sales to
Saudi Arabia.”
How big the gap is must be seen. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs Michael Roth told German weekly Der Spiegel:
“Franco-German cooperation offers the opportunity to make Europe more
sovereign, but we too will have to compromise on this.” His colleague
for Defence Ursula von der Leyen said: “The insistence on maximum
positions does not create a strong community.” There is an ongoing struggle to relax arms export policies
between the two remaining large EU members. It already surfaced in
February around the potential French export of MBDA Meteor air-to-air
missiles to the Saudi's, estimated worth US$1 billion, with key
components produced by the German industry. Berlin wants to prevent the export
“as it is opposed to Saudi Arabia’s use of the Meteor-mounted Typhoons
in the Yemen conflict.” The Meteor is the first serious test for the
direction of “a common approach to arms exports.”
MB 19/02/2019