Walrus-class submarine at Zeebrugge Naval Days, July 1st, 2016. |
The
Netherlands is in the midst of a multi billion euro acquisition of
new conventional submarines to replace its current class. Recently
the acquisition process was scrutinised by a
large amount of questions (267) by members of
the parliament and answers by the government.
The
acquisition has a defence-industrial component and will impact future
European arms exports as well as the proliferation of submarine
capabilities and technology. Three different wharfs are shortlisted,
all linking to a Dutch counterpart: Swedish SAAB Kockums (with
Damen); French Naval Group (with Royal IHC); and German Thyssen Krupp
Marine Systems ('Submarine Valley' in Den Helder, home port of the
Dutch navy).
European
exports
“No
European country can maintain the competitivity of its defense
industry based on just its own domestic market,” said Hervé
Guillou, director of the French Naval Group. This
also applies to diesel electric submarines
production.
During
the past 25 years, 178 conventional submarines have been
commissioned. Of these China has produced 45, all but two (delivered
to Bangladesh) for its own inventories; Russia produced 32, of which
25 were exported to five different countries; and 78 were produced or
developed by one or more European Union members. They exported the
lion share, 55, to 14 different countries in and outside EU/NATO+.
The US is missing, although by far the largest submarine force,
because it only produces nuclear – no diesel – submarines.
European countries not only export hulls but also engines, sensors
and weapon systems. Thirteen of the vessels have for example radar,
sonar of electronic warfare capabilities of Thales aboard (see
table). The submarine market is a 'buyers market' where margins for
profit are small and lucrative offers to tempt clients to buy will be
enormous. This week Guillou
stated the Dutch ocean going submarine would be a welcome
addition to the portfolio of the Naval Group.
According to the Dutch
government, one of the reasons to acquire a new submarine is the
worldwide proliferation of submarines. Potentially the Dutch will
contribute to this problem themselves. However in Parliamentary
questions the concern about export is restricted to export of Dutch
knowledge to foreign European wharfs (this will be prevented by
agreements on the transfer of technology) and to the exports of
submarines by China. Some MPs already want to anticipate income from
exports to change the picture on costs.
Tasks
The
costs of the intended submarine acquisition are still confidential,
but the contract is classified in the highest government cost range
for acquisitions over € 2.5 billion (it will be probably close to €
3.5 billion for four submarines). The submarines will be tasked with
world wide power projection, intelligence gathering (as the current
class did e.g. in the Adriatic, Persian Gulf and near the coast of
Venezuela), and covert deployment of special forces. They must be
able to influence strategic situations and to create defensive and
offensive fighting power. The demands on the new class of submarines
are broader defined and weaponry and sensors will be improved. They
will be also less depended on supplies. The major disadvantage is the
reduced radius, due to the fact it has no external fuel tanks, but
this is
to improve stealthiness.
The role of the submarine is growing in importance
because large surface vessel are much more vulnerable, according
to naval expert Eric Wertheim. The logic to buy such boats is
about power in a world moving towards a Cold War 2.0. Security may be
better served with disarmament, arms control and confidence building
measures, at least for the arms industry that is not an attractive
alternative.
Weaponry
Torpedo's
are the only weapon system specifically mentioned so far. It will be
most probably the US Mk-48 torpedo. Recently the US State Department
approved a Foreign
Military Sale to the Netherlands of sixteen of the Mod 7 Advanced
Technology (AT) torpedo conversion kits for these and related
equipment for an estimated cost of US$ 85 million. The last
government letter (B-brief)
on the submarine acquisition mentioned a “limited
number and a diversity on weapons and special forces storage.”
In the questions it is stated this will have an effect on limited
capacity for unmanned vessels (underwater drones, or UUVs). To shed
some light on what may be expected, lets look to some of the last
submarines of the shortlisted wharfs: the French designed Indian
Scorpéne class can fire exocet anti-ship missiles, the German 212
class and Swedish Blekinge-class have also a mine laying capacity.
Combat Fleets of the World of 2013 mentions a "payload
tube capable of employing naval special forces, swimmer delivery
vehicles or unmanned systems," (also mentioned on the Swedish
wiki on the two boats). Obviously all three have torpedo tubes.
Article
346 and defence industry
Reading the questions of the Dutch MPs the influence of the industry lobby jumps from the pages. Many questions are asked several times in exact the same wording. MPs fear Dutch knowledge will disappear when foreign submarine builders will be chosen to build the boats. As if there is a Dutch submarine builder available or easily created without hurdles and much higher costs. The Dutch government has some problems to make clear – to nationalist Members of Parliament with other presumptions - there is no foreign Dutch combined principle contractor, all design authorities and thus responsible wharfs are foreign, because the Netherlands has no self-creating submarine shipbuilding capacity for 25 years. The Ministry of Defence made clear knowledge will come to the Netherlands instead of leaving it. Nether the less the Dutch naval lobby complained the answering of the questions showed the Dutch government do not care about Dutch naval shipbuilding.
Reading the questions of the Dutch MPs the influence of the industry lobby jumps from the pages. Many questions are asked several times in exact the same wording. MPs fear Dutch knowledge will disappear when foreign submarine builders will be chosen to build the boats. As if there is a Dutch submarine builder available or easily created without hurdles and much higher costs. The Dutch government has some problems to make clear – to nationalist Members of Parliament with other presumptions - there is no foreign Dutch combined principle contractor, all design authorities and thus responsible wharfs are foreign, because the Netherlands has no self-creating submarine shipbuilding capacity for 25 years. The Ministry of Defence made clear knowledge will come to the Netherlands instead of leaving it. Nether the less the Dutch naval lobby complained the answering of the questions showed the Dutch government do not care about Dutch naval shipbuilding.
The
Netherlands want a off-the-shelve design to be adopted to specific
Dutch wishes and including Dutch technology. In the process the Dutch
made an appeal to article
346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and
thus did not tender the order to the open market, to 'protect
essential security interests'. Access, strengthening, and expansion
of submarine related knowledge and craft is essential to the
Netherlands, according to the government, and article 346 provides a
tool to demand involvement of Dutch industry of the foreign party
delivering the submarine. Not only the industry which will be
involved but also military research institutions (Marin naval
research, TNO and UK's BMT).
Risks
Dutch parliament
members asked for the risks behind the program. The government sees
three different kinds of risks: technical (like integration of
systems, political (like slow moving decision) and waning social
support for the replacement. The Government keeps itself informed on
these risks, but details are confidential. Until now the debate is
limited to specialist articles in the papers, defence industry,
different
opinions between Ministries (Defence, Finance and Economics) and
lobbyists. One of the social democrat parties, the SP, tries to raise
awareness that money spend on submarines cannot be spend on social
services. Besides that, this submarine acquisition does not
contribute to a Dutch military protecting the country, but to a
military strengthening interventionist policies and the danger of
submarine exports.
Langere versie van voor Stop Wapenhandel geschreven blog.
Conventional
submarines, globally commissioned since 1995
|
||||
No.
|
Name
of class
|
Country
|
Builder
|
Produce
of
|
16
|
Ming
*,**
|
China
|
Wuhan
Shipbuilding Industries
|
China
|
1
|
Qing
|
China
|
Wuhan
Shipbuilding Industries
|
China
|
14
|
Song
(type 39)*
|
China
|
Wuhan
Shipbuilding Industries
|
China
|
12
|
Yuan
(type 41)
|
China
|
Wuhan
Shipbuilding Industries
|
China
|
2
(of 4)
|
Ming
class
|
Bangladesh
|
Wuchang
Shipyard, Wuhan
|
China
|
3
|
Agosta
90B*
|
Pakistan
|
DCN
(1) and Karachi NSY (2)
|
France
|
2
|
Scorpène-class*
|
Malaysia
|
DCN
|
France/Spain
|
4
|
Kalvari
(Scorpène )*
|
India
|
Mazagon
Dock Limited
|
France/Spain
|
2
|
Scorpène-class*
|
Chile
|
DCN/Navantia
|
France/Spain
|
1
(of 4)
|
Scorpène-class*
|
Brazil
|
DCN/Brazilian
navy
|
France/Spain
|
3
(of 4)
|
Preveze
class (Type 209T1/1400)
|
Turkey
|
Gölcük
Naval Shipyard
|
Germ,any
|
4
|
Gür
class (Type 209T2/1400)
|
Turkey
|
Gölcük
Naval Shipyard
|
Germ,any
|
3
|
Heroine
class (Type 209 1400-Mod)*
|
S.
Africa
|
HDW
|
Germ,any
|
2
|
Tridente-class
(Type 214) *
|
Portugal
|
HDW
|
Germ,any
|
8
|
Sohn
Wonyil class (Type-214)
|
S.
Korea
|
HDW/Daewoo
S&ME/Hyundai HI
|
Germ,any
|
7
(of 9)
|
Chang
Bogo class (Type 209)
|
S.
Korea
|
HDW/Deawoo
S&ME
|
Germ,any
|
4
|
Todaro
class (type 212)
|
Italy
|
HDW/Fincantieri
SpA
|
Germ,any
|
6
|
Dolphin
1 and 2 (Type 212)
|
Israel
|
Nordseewerke
Emden and HDW
|
Germ,any
|
3
|
Nagapasa
class
|
Indonesia
|
Daewoo
S&ME, Korea/PT PAL, Indo
|
Germ,any
|
4
|
Papanikolis
(Type 214)*
|
Greece
|
HDW/Hellenic
SY
|
Germ,any
|
10
|
Type-212
|
Germany
|
HDW/Thyssen
|
Germ,any
|
2
|
Type-209/1400mod
class
|
HDW
|
Germ,any
|
|
1
(of 5)
|
Tupi
209 class 1400 mod*
|
Brazil
|
HDW/Brazilian
Navy
|
Germ,any
|
11
|
Soryu
|
Japan
|
Kawasaki
and Mitsuibishi, both Kobe
|
Japan
|
11
|
Oyashio
|
Japan
|
Kawasaki
and Mitsuibishi, both Kobe
|
Japan
|
1
|
Project
S126
|
Japan
|
Kawasaki,
Kobe
|
Japan
|
6
|
Kilo
(Project 636)
|
China
|
Admiralty
Shipyard, Saint Petersburg
|
Russia
|
5
|
Project
636
|
Russia
|
Krasnoye
Sormovo/Adm SY/Zvodni
|
Russia
|
2
|
Lada
|
Russia
|
Admiralty
Shipyard, Saint Petersburg
|
Russia
|
1
(of 3)
|
Younis/Yunes
Kilo (project 877EKM)
|
Iran
|
Admiralty
Shipyard, Saint Petersburg
|
Russia
|
2
(of 10)
|
Sindhughosh
Kilo (project 877EKM)
|
India
|
Admiralty
Shipyard, Saint Petersburg
|
Russia
|
2
|
Kilo
(Project 877EKM)
|
China
|
Krasnoye
|
Russia
|
10
|
Kilo
(Project 636)
|
China
|
Admiral
SY /Krasnoye/Sevmash
|
Russia
|
4
|
Improved
Kilo (project 636)
|
Algeria
|
Admiralty
Shipyard, Saint Petersburg
|
Russia
|
3
|
Gotland
classe
|
Sweden
|
Kockums
|
Sweden
|
6
|
Collins
*
|
Australia
|
Australian
Submarine Corp. Kockums
|
Sweden/Autralia
|
Sources:
Notes:
|
Eric
Wertheim, Combat fleets of the world, 16th edition;
wiki pages on submarines, per class and country.
*
with Thales sonar, electronic warfare (EW), or radar.
**
Ming was built between 1975 and 2003. But 12 Ming Type 035G from
1990 to 1999 and 4 035B between 2000 and 2003.
|