Almost all of
Russia's modern military hardware is depended upon complex
electronics imported from the US, UK, Germany, Japan, Israel, China,
the Netherlands, and some other countries. According to the UK
report: Operation
Z; the death throes of an imperial illusion the Netherlands is
one of the countries selling electronic components to Russia for
military radio's. They“form the backbone of the Russian
military's tactical communication.” This kind of information
stresses the importance of stronger controls to frustrate Russia's
war.
Text continues below illustration
The technology was found
during technical research by the Ukrainian intelligence community and
from leaked Russian documents and described in a technical reports
seen by the authors of British Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI), which is a renowned part of the
UK defence establishment.
Electronic components
A advanced weapon is a
complicated system and can not properly function without specialised
technology. Russia is not able to produce all these parts itself. The
Il-76 transport aircraft’s communications suite alone is e.g.
identified to contain eighty components that can not be replaced with
manufactured parts in Russia. These parts have to be imported. This
dependency on foreign technology is true for most of Russia's
advanced weapon systems.
Sanctions are therefor not symbolic,
they really hamper Russian military and arms industry operations.
They would even be stronger when paired with the sanctions on Russian
oil and gas which bring foreign currency to Russia to buy weaponry
(SIPRI
concluded the oil revenue's and the military budget are closely
linked) sanctions now slowly introduced
by the European Union member states. However closing
all the gaps in the EU control on strategic exports was far from
resolute before
the war started.
Foreign dependency
As the war in Ukraine
will be longer than the Russians had expected also the access to this
technology becomes more essential for Putin's military. Russia is
currently developing several ways to bypass sanctions by creating:
overviews of what is produced domestically; what can be bought from
'friendly' countries; and by the covert means to obtain the essential
technology, even without permission of the owner of the intellectual
property. Russia set up shell companies to try even to import weapon
manufacturing technology, as research by the Belgian
French language public broadcaster RTBF recently revealed based
on leaked documents.
In an annexed table to the RUSI report,
the writers gave an example of foreign made components inside a
Russian weapon system, the Automatic Radio Interference (jamming)
Station Borisoglebsk
2. This system is a major tool in Electronic Warfare and designed
to disrupt communications and GPS systems.
It is produced since February 2015, so after the sanctions because of
the Krim annexation were installed. Soon after production was
launched they were used in Eastern Ukraine (and also Syria) in a way
even NATO would have difficulties to resist.
Export permission
In the four page
illustrated table RUSI gave the subsystems and the subsequent
elements with production code and country of origin for the jamming
system. Many parts come from the US, and some from Germany, South
Korea, Taiwan, the UK and the Netherlands. The Dutch element is a
so-called broadband RF transistor (BLF647P).
It is produced by Ampleon
with its Headquarters in Nijmegen. It seems to fall under the
EU dual use code (5A001.4)
The Dutch government gave several permissions
for exports to Russia of the A5001 category of technology in 2016 and
2017. It is not clear if these licenses were connected to these
items. It is also not clear if the subsystems for the military
jamming system are regarded dual use by the Dutch government. And if
not, whether this will change after the RUSI revelations. And most
likely the reported components are far from all the authors have
seen; there might also be more Dutch components.
The report
states that companies manufacturing the components may not know the
Russian military was the end-user. That can hardly be an excuse if it
continues until today. But it is not only the responsibility of the
producers to know. It is also the governments providing the licenses
to export the dual use products who have to play a controlling role
in this. The findings in the Ukrainian intelligence reports as seen
by RUSI are underlining the need to actively inform and control
producers not to sell to Russia and be careful when re-exports may be
a potential danger.
Collaborative approach
Questions must be raised by all sectors of society coming across such information, like people in the manufacture industry, controlling agencies, investigative journalist, hackers and activists. Daniel Salisbury in an article following the RUSI report calls for a collaborative approach which should ensure the implementation of export controls to help undermine Putin's war machine. To halt the supply policies should go further than merely putting embargoes in place.
It is impossible to close all gaps to Russia. Re-export of technology can be limited with tighter control, end use declarations and controls, but the the majority of countries in the world still have friendly relations with Russia and may be willing to be part of covered re-export. The RUSI report states that these supply routes must be constrained. It will be a delicate policy to do this without alienating the governments in these states. Ending dual use export to countries friendly to Russia all together is impossible for several reasons. It is a large part of the economy, difficult to control and items are useful for military and civil use in a wide array of sectors like the food industry, health care, scientific research etc. A more severe policy is possible.
Russia is preparing for a
protracted conflict and stopping the technology for this must be an
important part of the efforts to stop this war: “Limiting
Russia's ability top protract fighting beyond the summer could be
effectively enabled by reducing its access to modern armaments,”
RUSI concludes. Is the Dutch government doing all what can be done to
prevent future exports of Dutch technology for weaponry and military
technology used against Ukraine? It is time to demand serious
control.
Written for Stop Wapenhandel
Nederlandstalig: Nederlandseexport helpt Russen op het slagveld
