Scientist Emma Ashford
developed a theory that war for oil is not happening often. She had
to go eighty years back to collect just two cases: the Japanese
occupation of oil rich Indonesia in World War II and the annexation
of tiny but oil rich Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. To control the fossil
fuel resources, other methods than open conflict are more easy.
It
is not war for oil but arms for oil. The top-10 list of arms
importing countries is filled with oil rich and/or dependent (10%+ of
BBP comes from oil) countries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar
and Algeria, but also Australia and China fit in one or more
categories as defined by Ashford. China produces a large amount of
oil, but because of the size of its economy this is far from enough
for its total consumption. Major military powers like Russia and the
United States are not listed because they produce weapons at home and
are largely independent from imports.
Ashford concludes,
measuring SIPRI figures over a long period, that oil wealthy states
“though a relatively small proportion of all states globally, they
have been well represented among top arms importers, both during the
Cold War and after.” She investigates this relationship in the
chapter Resource arms racing; oil wealth and military power. Below
the table 10 observations she made.
|
|
Total
TIV2 |
Classes of oil states1 |
|
India |
18,393 |
|
|
Saudi Arabia |
17,906 |
a,b,c,d |
|
Egypt |
9,472 |
a |
|
Australia |
8,320 |
b |
|
China |
7,698 |
a,c |
|
Qatar |
7,098 |
a,b, c |
|
South Korea |
6,702 |
|
|
Algeria |
6,402 |
a,b, c |
|
Pakistan |
4,908 |
|
|
UAE |
4,734 |
a,b,c,d |
|
*
Classes defined by Ashford: |
||
1 The link between oil wealth and military expenditures and arms acquisitions has been considered true for so long that it has not been tested. Analysis shows there is little doubt it is an important factor. Oil-wealthy states spend disproportionate more on the military in absolute figures (oil rich have a much bigger pie to share) and as a share of government expenditure in oil rich autocracies.
2 Oil rich countries wage war more
often than countries who are not. War and preparation for war is not
hindered by domestic pressures for priorities; substantial budgetary
trade-offs are not needed. It might be described as “resource arms
racing.” As oil prices rise, so does military spending, the data
show.
3 Arms races in regions rich of oil drag along
non-petrostates which raise military budgets in response to their
neighbours. A chain reaction shows how this may work: Riyad buys arms
to be able to confront Teheran. This triggers Israel to further
enhance its arsenal. Followed by escalation in Syria, Jordan and
Egypt which ripples through to Turkey and Iraq.
4 There are
limits how much military might wealth can create; high military
spending does not make a state automatically military capable. Tasks
must be trained, executed and embedded in an organization. Those
structures have the risk to be weak in oil rich states, because often
the easily available wealth leads to the lesser need of an effective
state apparatuses. These states are often ruled by a tiny elite.
6 Oil rich states spend disproportional on the military and are often led by a small elite which is over confident in the capacity to fight wars and achieve victory at low cost. Moscow and Ryad have shown it is easy to miscalculate when deciding to start a war.
8 More than 75 percent of insurgencies receive external support. Oil rich countries are more likely to support rebel groups or friendly governments. Of the 3,948 cases of external proxy support between 1965 and 2012 oil wealthy states were responsible for 25 percent of cases while they make up for 9 percent of all countries. In this respect they act similar to major powers.
9 Arms sales make oil rich countries dependent on the source of supply for training, overhaul, spare parts etc. But is is also part of a mechanism by major powers to control the financial resources of the petrostates. The consequential military relationship can also be use to ask for more production when prices go up with more military support in return. (See for that debate e.g. Oil Money by David M. Wright)
10 Russia, Saudi Arabia and the US, with a combined oil production of 40 percent of global production, are prepared to wage war two times as easy as nations who are not oil rich. They are less vulnerable to sanctions. In general, countries with large amounts take the decision to wage war easier, also because they do not have to fear sanctions.
What should this mean for arms export
policies? Are the disproportional military expenditures just an
opportunity for weapon producers? Even when oil rich countries
support proxies easier and involvement in violent conflict is much
higher? It seems most nations are more eager to support those
countries with arms exports (and re-cash oil revenues) than to limit
exports to dangerous oil rich areas.
Ashford wrote her book
before Russia invaded Ukraine. That is before the price of fossil
fuels skyrocketed because of this war. Fossil fuel sanctions against
Russia create a higher price and extra income for the Putin clique to
pay military, mercenaries, arms production and import of
sophisticated technology it is lacking because of the embargo from
Western sources. It also makes life in Europe so expensive that
internal tension and troubles must be expected this winter.
Unless
countries extremely speed up their energy saving and renewable
production, ending imports from Russia will mean replacement by
suppliers from gas and oil rich Middle Eastern autocrat regimes
(waging also horrible wars), by shale extraction, and even by more
polluting uranium and coal. War for oil may be rare, but energy
supplies and war are closely connected. Influencing the price of oil
and gas is may be a more important weapon than the supply of energy.
Written for Stop Wapenhandel
