New Dutch submarines; how about arms export and proliferation?

The Netherlands is in the midst of a multi billion euro acquisition of new conventional submarines to replace its current class. Recently the acquisition process was scrutinised by a large amount of questions (267) by members of the parliament and answers by the government.

The acquisition has a defence-industrial component and will impact future European arms exports as well as the proliferation of submarine capabilities and technology. Three different wharfs are shortlisted, all linking to a Dutch counterpart: Swedish SAAB Kockums (with Damen); French Naval Group (with Royal IHC); and German Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems ('Submarine Valley' in Den Helder, home port of the Dutch navy).

European exports

“No European country can maintain the competitivity of its defense industry based on just its own domestic market,” said Hervé Guillou, director of the French Naval Group. This also applies to diesel electric submarines production.

During the past 25 years, 178 conventional submarines have been commissioned. Of these China has produced 45, all but two (delivered to Bangladesh) for its own inventories; Russia produced 32, of which 25 were exported to five different countries; and 78 were produced or developed by one or more European Union members. They exported the lion share, 55, to 14 different countries in and outside EU/NATO+. The US is missing, although by far the largest submarine force, because it only produces nuclear – no diesel – submarines. European countries not only export hulls but also engines, sensors and weapon systems. Thirteen of the vessels have for example radar, sonar of electronic warfare capabilities of Thales aboard (see table). The submarine market is a 'buyers market' where margins for profit are small and lucrative offers to tempt clients to buy will be enormous. This week Guillou stated the Dutch ocean going submarine would be a welcome addition to the portfolio of the Naval Group.

According to the Dutch government, one of the reasons to acquire a new submarine is the worldwide proliferation of submarines. Potentially the Dutch will contribute to this problem themselves. However in Parliamentary questions the concern about export is restricted to export of Dutch knowledge to foreign European wharfs (this will be prevented by agreements on the transfer of technology) and to the exports of submarines by China. Some MPs already want to anticipate income from exports to change the picture on costs.

Tasks

The costs of the intended submarine acquisition are still confidential, but the contract is classified in the highest government cost range for acquisitions over € 2.5 billion (it will be probably close to € 3.5 billion for four submarines). The submarines will be tasked with world wide power projection, intelligence gathering (as the current class did e.g. in the Adriatic, Persian Gulf and near the coast of Venezuela), and covert deployment of special forces. They must be able to influence strategic situations and to create defensive and offensive fighting power. The demands on the new class of submarines are broader defined and weaponry and sensors will be improved. They will be also less depended on supplies. The major disadvantage is the reduced radius, due to the fact it has no external fuel tanks, but this is to improve stealthiness.

The role of the submarine is growing in importance because large surface vessel are much more vulnerable, according to naval expert Eric Wertheim. The logic to buy such boats is about power in a world moving towards a Cold War 2.0. Security may be better served with disarmament, arms control and confidence building measures, at least for the arms industry that is not an attractive alternative.

Weaponry

Torpedo's are the only weapon system specifically mentioned so far. It will be most probably the US Mk-48 torpedo. Recently the US State Department approved a Foreign Military Sale to the Netherlands of sixteen of the Mod 7 Advanced Technology (AT) torpedo conversion kits for these and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$ 85 million. The last government letter (B-brief) on the submarine acquisition mentioned a “limited number and a diversity on weapons and special forces storage.” In the questions it is stated this will have an effect on limited capacity for unmanned vessels (underwater drones, or UUVs). To shed some light on what may be expected, lets look to some of the last submarines of the shortlisted wharfs: the French designed Indian Scorpéne class can fire exocet anti-ship missiles, the German 212 class and Swedish Blekinge-class have also a mine laying capacity. Combat Fleets of the World of 2013 mentions a "payload tube capable of employing naval special forces, swimmer delivery vehicles or unmanned systems," (also mentioned on the Swedish wiki on the two boats). Obviously all three have torpedo tubes.

Article 346 and defence industry
Reading the questions of the Dutch MPs the influence of the industry lobby jumps from the pages. Many questions are asked several times in exact the same wording. MPs fear Dutch knowledge will disappear when foreign submarine builders will be chosen to build the boats. As if there is a Dutch submarine builder available or easily created without hurdles and much higher costs. The Dutch government has some problems to make clear – to nationalist Members of Parliament with other presumptions - there is no foreign Dutch combined principle contractor, all design authorities and thus responsible wharfs are foreign, because the Netherlands has no self-creating submarine shipbuilding capacity for 25 years. The Ministry of Defence made clear knowledge will come to the Netherlands instead of leaving it. Nether the less the Dutch naval lobby complained the answering of the questions showed the Dutch government do not care about Dutch naval shipbuilding.

The Netherlands want a off-the-shelve design to be adopted to specific Dutch wishes and including Dutch technology. In the process the Dutch made an appeal to article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and thus did not tender the order to the open market, to 'protect essential security interests'. Access, strengthening, and expansion of submarine related knowledge and craft is essential to the Netherlands, according to the government, and article 346 provides a tool to demand involvement of Dutch industry of the foreign party delivering the submarine. Not only the industry which will be involved but also military research institutions (Marin naval research, TNO and UK's BMT).

Risks 

Dutch parliament members asked for the risks behind the program. The government sees three different kinds of risks: technical (like integration of systems, political (like slow moving decision) and waning social support for the replacement. The Government keeps itself informed on these risks, but details are confidential. Until now the debate is limited to specialist articles in the papers, defence industry, different opinions between Ministries (Defence, Finance and Economics) and lobbyists. One of the social democrat parties, the SP, tries to raise awareness that money spend on submarines cannot be spend on social services. Besides that, this submarine acquisition does not contribute to a Dutch military protecting the country, but to a military strengthening interventionist policies and the danger of submarine exports.

Conventional submarines, globally commissioned since 1995
No.	Name of class	Country	Builder	Produce of
16	Ming *,**	China	Wuhan Shipbuilding Industries	China
1	Qing	China	Wuhan Shipbuilding Industries	China
14	Song (type 39)*	China	Wuhan Shipbuilding Industries	China
12	Yuan (type 41)	China	Wuhan Shipbuilding Industries	China
2 (of 4)	Ming class	Bangladesh	Wuchang Shipyard, Wuhan	China
3	Agosta 90B*	Pakistan	DCN (1) and Karachi NSY (2)	France
2	Scorpène-class*	Malaysia	DCN	France/Spain
4	Kalvari (Scorpène )*	India	Mazagon Dock Limited	France/Spain
2	Scorpène-class*	Chile	DCN/Navantia	France/Spain
1 (of 4)	Scorpène-class*	Brazil	DCN/Brazilian navy	France/Spain
3 (of 4)	Preveze class (Type 209T1/1400)	Turkey	Gölcük Naval Shipyard	Germ,any
4	Gür class (Type 209T2/1400)	Turkey	Gölcük Naval Shipyard	Germ,any
3	Heroine class (Type 209 1400-Mod)*	S. Africa	HDW	Germ,any
2	Tridente-class (Type 214) *	Portugal	HDW	Germ,any
8	Sohn Wonyil class (Type-214)	S. Korea	HDW/Daewoo S&ME/Hyundai HI	Germ,any
7 (of 9)	Chang Bogo class (Type 209)	S. Korea	HDW/Deawoo S&ME	Germ,any
4	Todaro class (type 212)	Italy	HDW/Fincantieri SpA	Germ,any
6	Dolphin 1 and 2 (Type 212)	Israel	Nordseewerke Emden and HDW	Germ,any
3	Nagapasa class	Indonesia	Daewoo S&ME, Korea/PT PAL, Indo	Germ,any
4	Papanikolis (Type 214)*	Greece	HDW/Hellenic SY	Germ,any
10	Type-212	Germany	HDW/Thyssen	Germ,any
2	Type-209/1400mod class		HDW	Germ,any
1 (of 5)	Tupi 209 class 1400 mod*	Brazil	HDW/Brazilian Navy	Germ,any
11	Soryu	Japan	Kawasaki and Mitsuibishi, both Kobe	Japan
11	Oyashio	Japan	Kawasaki and Mitsuibishi, both Kobe	Japan
1	Project S126	Japan	Kawasaki, Kobe	Japan
6	Kilo (Project 636)	China	Admiralty Shipyard, Saint Petersburg	Russia
5	Project 636	Russia	Krasnoye Sormovo/Adm SY/Zvodni	Russia
2	Lada	Russia	Admiralty Shipyard, Saint Petersburg	Russia
1 (of 3)	Younis/Yunes Kilo (project 877EKM)	Iran	Admiralty Shipyard, Saint Petersburg	Russia
2 (of 10)	Sindhughosh Kilo (project 877EKM)	India	Admiralty Shipyard, Saint Petersburg	Russia
2	Kilo (Project 877EKM)	China	Krasnoye	Russia
10	Kilo (Project 636)	China	Admiral SY /Krasnoye/Sevmash	Russia
4	Improved Kilo (project 636)	Algeria	Admiralty Shipyard, Saint Petersburg	Russia
3	Gotland classe	Sweden	Kockums	Sweden
6	Collins *	Australia	Australian Submarine Corp. Kockums	Sweden/Autralia
Sources: Notes:	Eric Wertheim, Combat fleets of the world, 16th edition; wiki pages on submarines, per class and country. * with Thales sonar, electronic warfare (EW), or radar. ** Ming was built between 1975 and 2003. But 12 Ming Type 035G from 1990 to 1999 and 4 035B between 2000 and 2003.

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Werknemers betalen de prijs voor corruptie wapenbedrijf

Airbus is een Europees civiel-militair luchtvaartbedrijf met vestigingen in Frankrijk, Duitsland en Spanje. Het is voor 26 procent staatseigendom in deze landen (zie afbeelding).

Om financiële en organisatorische redenen heeft Airbus zijn officiële hoofdkantoor en diverse financiële holdings in belastingparadijs Nederland gevestigd (zie tabel). Airbus is 's werelds grootste bouwer van civiele vliegtuigen, maar levert ook gevechtshelikopters, straaljagers, drones, cybertechnologie en militaire satellieten en is daarmee de negende grootste wapenproducent ter wereld.

Het bedrijf is - zoals veel militaire bedrijven - gevoelig voor corruptie. Eind januari resulteerden jarenlange juridische onderzoeken in een afkoopsom van € 3,6 miljard te betalen aan Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië en de Verenigde Staten om meerdere gevallen van omkoping te regelen. Ook werd voor twee jaar een externe toezichthouder aangesteld voor de afhandeling van defensiegerelateerde transacties.

Het Britse Serious Fraud Office (SFO) onderzocht onder meer transactie in Ghana en constateerde dat Airbus met het bedrijf verbonden personen niet verhinderde om "anderen om te kopen die betrokken waren bij de aanschaf van militaire transportvliegtuigen [C-295] door de regering van Ghana".

Het Amerikaanse ministerie van Justitie vermeld ook Vietnam en Indonesië in verband met corruptie rond de aankoop van hetzelfde vliegtuig. In Vietnam "hadden Airbus of haar verkopers politieke bijdragen, vergoedingen of commissies betaald, aangeboden of ermee ingestemd in verband met deze verkoop, ten bedrage van € 6.150.226." In het geval van Indonesië deden ze dat  "voor een bedrag van ongeveer € 16.100.000." Het rapport concludeert: “De brutowinst van Airbus op de verkoop van de bovengenoemde C-295's aan Ghana, Indonesië en Vietnam bedroeg ongeveer $ 165.208.895.”

Zowel de VS als Groot-Brittannië melden ook het omkopen van Oostenrijkse functionarissen bij onderhandelingen rond de aanschaf van de Eurofighter. De Eurofighter is een gezamenlijk product van Airbus, British Aerospace en het Italiaanse Leonardo. Een voorstel van de Oostenrijkse minister van Defensie voor herstel of compensatie werd door Airbus brutaalweg op zij geschoven, omdat "eisen geen juridische basis hebben, daarom beslist worden afgewezen en niet worden besproken".

Komen grote wapenbedrijven niet te gemakkelijk weg met financiële criminaliteit als ze een financiële regeling kunnen treffen? De Britse SFO-directeur Osofsky noemde de afkoopsom op de BBC "een zeer goede deal voor de belastingbetaler" wat een curieuze kijk geeft op gerechtigheid bij fraude. Journalist James Booth merkte in de financiële Londense krant City A.M. op: "Processen zijn vaak lang en ingewikkeld, met beklaagden die niet passen in het profiel van de stereotype crimineel". Andrew Smith van de Campaign Against Arms Trade noemde de schikking: "opnieuw een geval waarbij een groot wapenbedrijf zich uit een juridisch onderzoek koopt".

Ondertussen meldt Airbus tegenvallende resultaten over 2019 voor zijn de divisie Defensie en Ruimtevaart, in vergelijking met het voorgaande jaar. Het bedrijf geeft daarvoor drie redenen: a) de boete van €3,6 miljard b) te weinig aankoop door de eigen overheid, zoals het besluit van de Duitse luchtmacht om af te zien van aankoop van twee A400M-transportvliegtuigen en c) het Duitse besluit om de wapenuitvoer naar Saoedi-Arabië op te schorten.

Hoewel de boete wegens corruptie veruit de grootste aanslag is op de winst bij de militaire productie worden de gevolgen hiervan noch door het management, noch door de aandeelhouders gedragen. De winstuitkering voor aandeelhouders wordt verhoogd tot € 1,80 per aandeel, + 9% ten opzichte van 2018. Het zijn de werknemers die de prijs betalen. Airbus kondigde aan om in 2021 2.362 van zijn 34.000 werknemers (= 7 procent) te ontslaan bij divisie Defensie en Ruimtevaart. In Duitsland zijn dat 829 arbeidsplaatsen, in Spanje 630, in Frankrijk 404, in Verenigd Koninkrijk 357 en 142 in andere landen. Op andere divisies, met name civiele luchtvaart, maakt Airbus overigens wel flink winst. Airbus’ EBIT (maatstaf voor de operationele winst voor aftrek van rente en belastingen) nam toe met 32% tot € 6,358 miljoen (2018: €4.808 miljoen).

De aankondiging van ontslagen in de militaire divisie kan niet los worden gezien van pogingen om druk te zetten op de regeringen in Berlijn en Parijs om aankoopbeslissingen voor militaire goederen te versnellen en en een soepeler wapenexportbeleid te voeren. Samen met British Aerospace heeft Airbus een groot belang bij het afzwakken van het Duitse wapenembargo op Saoedi-Arabië. Er hangt een miljardendeal in de lucht van 48 Eurofighters voor Riyadh. Helaas voor Airbus wordt het Duitse embargo hoogstwaarschijnlijk verlengd op de huidige einddatum van 31 maart 2020.

Dutch Airbus entities at the Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel, KvK)
Name*	Activity	KvK no.
Airbus SE	Financial Holding	24288945
Airbus Defence and Space Netherlands B.V.	Subsidiary	28086907
Airbus Group Proj B.V.	Financial Holding	63545128
Airbus Finance B.V.	Financial Holding	34182495
Airbus Excess Shares Foundation	Foundation to collect excess shares	57558175
Source: Chamber of Commerce search on Airbus (accessed February 25, 2020) and records on Excess Shares Foundation * The Chamber of Commerce gives some alternative names for the different Airbus entities like for example: Airbus Group, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, EADS, Dutch Space, Airbus DS Netherlands and EADC. For Airbus Finance as alternative EADS Finance is given.

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Not management, not shareholders but employees pay for Airbus underperformance

Airbus is a European civil-military aeronautic company based in France, Germany and Spain. It is 26 per cent state-owned (see figure, click to enlarge). For financial and organisational reasons it has its official headquarters in tax haven the Netherlands (see table). Airbus is the worlds largest builder of civil air liners, but produces also helicopters, fighter jets, drones, cybertechnology and military satellites, which makes it the ninth largest military company of the world.

The company is – like many military companies – prone to corruption. Late January, years of investigations resulted in an agreement to pay € 3.6 billion to France, UK and the US to settle multiple cases of bribary. The company also agreed to appoint an external compliance officer for two years to monitor the handling of its defence-related sales and disclosures around the world.

For one case, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigation concluded that Airbus failed to prevent persons associated with the company “from bribing others concerned with the purchase of military transport aircraft [C-295] by the Government of Ghana” despite the fact that the contract “contained a declaration of compliance with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, as well as a declaration that no more than €3,001,718.15 would be paid to agents in connection with the contract.”

Beside the Ghana case, the US Department of Justice report listed also Vietnam and Indonesia in connection to corruption around purchase of the same plane. In Vietnam “Airbus or its Vendors had paid, offered, or agreed to pay political contributions, fees, or commissions in connection with these sales, in the amount of € 6,150,226.” In the case of Indonesia they did “in the amount of approximately 16,100,000 Euros.” The report concludes that: “Airbus’s gross gain on the sales of the aforementioned C-295s to Ghana, Indonesia, and Vietnam was approximately $165,208,895.”

Airbus also failed to keep records on the sales of US controlled defence articles or defence services, as compulsory. Both the US and the UK reports the bribing of Austrian officials when trying to sell the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA, or Typhoon) to the air force of Austria. The EFA is a joint product of Airbus, British Aerospace and Italian Leonardo. A recent negotiation proposal with Austrian Minister of Defence Klaudia Tanner on reparation or compensation between Austria and Airbus was turned down by Airbus because “demands lack any legal basis, are therefore decidedly rejected and not discussed.”

In the UK the question is raised if leading big industries do not get away too easy with financial crime by arranging a financial settlements. UK SFO director Lisa Osofsky's remark to BBC that “It’s a very good win for the taxpayer” a somewhat curious view on justice in case of fraud. Journalist James Booth looked into detail to the question of responsibility in an OpEd in the London financial City A.M and notes: “Trials are often long and complicated with defendants who do not fit the profile of the stereotypical criminal”. Andrew Smith of the Campaign Against Arms Trade observed that the settlement: “looks like another case of a major arms company buying its way out of greater legal investigation”.

Currently the main issue for Airbus is the development of new fighter aircraft, the FCAS. But the Frankfurther Allgemeine points to the fact that the German figher Tornado must be replaced first. Will it be Boeing or the EFA consortium to win this double digit billion euro order?

Meanwhile Airbus reports underperformance of the defence and space division in 2019 compared to the previous year. The company gives several reasons: a) the fine of € 3.6 billion; b) failing military orders from the host countries, like the decision of the German Air Force to refused the delivery of two A400M transport planes; and c) the German decision to suspend arms exports to Saudi Arabia.

It is not the management, nor the shareholders, but the employees that will pay the price for the underperformance. Airbus announced to fire 2,362 of its 34,000 workers (= 7 per cent) by 2021 in its Defence and Space division: Germany, 829; Spain, 630; France, 404 posts; United Kingdom, 357; and 142 in other countries. The shareholders will get an increase of € 1.80 per share, +9% versus 2018.

The announcement of layoffs might as well be a weapon to influence the governments in Berlin, Paris and Madrid to speed up decisions on arms sales, domestic acquisitions and programs and to implement a more relaxed arms export policy. Together with British Aerospace, Airbus has an interest in watering down the German embargo on Saudi Arabia. It has put into question a multi-billion pound deal to sell 48 Eurofighters to Riyadh built by the EFA consortium also including German MTU Aero Engines. The German embargo will most likely be prolonged at its current end date of March 31 2020.

Dutch Airbus entities at the Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel, KvK)
Name*	Activity	KvK no.
Airbus SE	Financial Holding	24288945
Airbus Defence and Space Netherlands B.V.	Subsidiary	28086907
Airbus Group Proj B.V.	Financial Holding	63545128
Airbus Finance B.V.	Financial Holding	34182495
Airbus Excess Shares Foundation	Foundation to collect excess shares	57558175
Source: Chamber of Commerce search on Airbus (accessed February 25, 2020) and records on Excess Shares Foundation * The Chamber of Commerce gives some alternative names for the different Airbus entities like for example: Airbus Group, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, EADS, Dutch Space, Airbus DS Netherlands and EADC. For Airbus Finance as alternative EADS Finance is given.

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Written for Stop Wapenhandel

Turkish defence industry not a miracle

Turkish foreign and military policy becomes rapidly more assertive and autonomous. It can be seen in the Syria policy from the invasion to the current armed stand-off, in trafficking weapons to Libyan allies, in obstructing EU collaboration with NATO and in President Erdogan concluding agreements on defence industrial cooperation with other countries, from Malaysia to Senegal and Ukraine, on a scale even remarkable for a regional power.

When Turkey invaded Northern Syria, starting in October 2019, one of the issues which surfaced was the alleged independence of the country from arms imports because it had established a domestic arms industry. However the state of this industry must not be over-estimated.

Before looking into weapon programs first a look over the shoulder. The present state of the Turkish defence industry is not a miracle made by Ankara, but the result of an intentional policy by NATO. In 1993, the Dutch antimilitarist research collective AMOK investigated arms exports and support for the Turkish armed forces and support for the defence-industry (published as “De Turkije-connectie” also published in English and German).

Turkey was seen at the time as one of NATO's Less Developed Defence Industry (LDDI) countries. NATO-countries like the US, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK, with more advanced armed forces and defence industries, commonly decided to help building the Turkish defence industry. NATO stands at the foundation of the growth of Turkish military industry. Nowadays Ankara sells its drones to for example Qatar.

But it is not solely NATO, it is also Turkey itself which made a difference. It established an organisation and infrastructure for defence production and the Under Secretariat for Defence Industries. Much of the military industries established in the eighties still exist until today.

Turkish defence spending also did grow fast. In 1993 Turkey had 811,000 military personnel and a defence budget of $ 11.2 bn of which it invested 25.5 per cent in materiel. In 2018 the Turkish budget can hardly be compared with that budget, it almost doubled to a $ 22.1 bn (both figures in 2017 currency) of which 38.6 per cent is invested in acquisitions (one of the highest rates in NATO). Personnel was axed to 157,100.

The creation of a infrastructure and higher budgets for downseized armed forces however has not made Turkey an independent manufacturer of armament. Although Turkish officials claim the Turkish defence industry has developed vehicle this or aircraft that on its own, most often it is using western technology or patented knowledge to build the home grown weaponry.

Last year a report was published by the Rojava Information Center (based in north east Syria) on the involvement of Western arms companies in Turkish military industrial build up. The writers unmask the home grown Altay tank as one with huge involvement of German Rheinmetall, doing whatever possible to evade arms control mechanisms. The report also mentions: Thales technology for the Turkish Göktürk spy satellite; MBDA which owns the Turkish defense company Eurosam and the contract Eurosam was awarded for the definition study of the future Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defence System; and Leonardo which operated a recently expanded subsidiary company in Turkey under the name of Selex ES Elektronik Turkey.

It is not easy to become an independent arms producer. Recently French engine producer Safran stated that France is one of four countries (the others US, Russia and the UK) able to develop fighter jet engines. Only this limited group can independently produce fighter jets. Even China still struggles, despite its seize and technological input from Russia.

When early January Turkish F-16's took off from Incirlik airbase – as part of the armed confrontation near Idlib – the fighters were propulsed by engines of General Electric, the F110 129 which are tested, overhauled and assembled at Turkish TEI. The role TEI plays is part of its policy with the aim “of becoming an engine manufacturer.” Turkish Aerospace Industries is co-producing F-16's at its plant, but that does not mean it builds the whole plane and weaponry. It has also a role in the F-35, but that role is meeting hurdles, because Turkish acquisition of Russian missile defence equipment complicates it cooperation with the US (see F35.com or table here for participating companies at an earlier stage). It is still dependent on technology from the US and others.

Turkey – with a military budget larger than Spain and almost as large as that of Italy – does not stop here. It has its own fighter jet project, the TF-X. Rolls-Royce made an offer to provide the engine, according to Turkish leading daily Hürriyet in September 2019. But in December, the US$ 132 million deal was on hold, because of differences of opinion on technology transfer.

Ankara also has eyes on cooperation in the new UK fighter jet, the Tempest: “Sweden, Japan, Italy and Turkey have been among the countries touted as being potential partners for a program aimed at seeing the first aircraft flying around 2035,” well informed Defense News stated in July 2019 (also with some Dutch involvement according to Euractive). It depends on how such cooperation develops what will be the contribution to Turkish growing independence concerning fighter aircraft.

The UK changed its policy on Turkey recently, following the recent incursion by the Turkish military in north east Syria. The UK in line with EU advise grants “no further export licences to Turkey for items which might be used in military operations in Syria,” and Open general export licences (OGEL) and Open general trade control licences (OGTCL) where reviewed. This is in line with an EU-advise followed by the majority of the European Union member states. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote also that Turkey was removed from the list of countries falling under such open licenses. But Turkey is a major customer for EU arms and its not the first time and will not be the last time the country is sanctioned. The German government licensed already some minor military deliverances to Turkey.

It is clear the Turkish state and its military have a long time program to develop itself as a regional power. Seen its assertive policy in the midst of one of the most destabilized regions Turkey may be an attractive market for arms. However it would wiser to close this market off and not quickly open it at the first opportunity. It is rather easy to help build a defence industry, compared to the difficulties to reign it in when is already established. As long as Turkey needs military tech from abroad this possibility however still exist.

Written for Stop Wapenhandel
Nederlandse vertaling zie hier.