To this aim the
French government has created a system in which arms export promotion
is much better organised than arms export controls. In the past,
France has even evaded United Nations arms embargoes, such as with
deliveries to South Africa during the Apartheid era. Arms companies
have bribed customers. And nowadays export depends on sales to brutal
regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Lucie Béraud-Sudreau* filleted
this policy in a book titled: French
arms exports over the past sixty years; the business of sovereignty,
published by the International
Institute of Strategic Studies IISS, a think tank closer to the
Military Industrial Complex than to its critics. That perspective
doesn't make the book less interesting.
The state-owned
enterprises established to support the French military grandeur
are still the foundation of the French arms
industry and the State still has a big finger in the corporate pie.
State aid included payments for equipment produced but not sold, a
policy abolished in 2000. Not abolished is Article 90, providing
loans for companies wanting to adapt weapons to the demands of a
foreign customer, which only have to be paid back when deliveries are
running.
Deliveries were given a noble label and supposed to be in
the interest of a balanced North-South relationship. After all,
France broke through the bi-polar Cold War model and Paris did not
attach any patronizing conditions to deliveries.
The export
policy proved successful: In 1960 8% of military production was
exported, in 1990 this had increased to yet 31%. The entire system
was set up for sales promotion; export control remained a neglected
child. If, despite this, the system faltered, the Elysée could serve
as a lubricating oil, as happened recently in two cases: François
Hollande and Emanuel Macron both intervened when the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs threatened to block arms deliveries to Saudi
Arabia.
Arms manufacturers have anyhow far more opportunities
to represent their interests than NGOs. The Dassault family, for
example, has had good relations with important politicians for
decades. In addition, the engineers who do the export control are
trained at the same École Polytechnique as the engineers of the arms
industry; cooperation is easy. On top of that, as bluntly put forward
by a Defense Ministry official: “French
parliamentarians don't give a damn” about
controlling arms exports.
There are some short periods of
policy improvement. This is encouraging, because it show that another
arms export policy is possible. Even more hope giving is that the
French anti-arms trade movement developed after the Cold War gained
strength in recent years. A recent survey
by Amnesty International France shows that
there is room for stricter peace and human rights scrutiny. The
policy needs moral and ethical improvement.
But opposition is
strong. Dassault pressed President Hollande to export Rafale fighter
jets in order to hold up production lines for the French armed
forces. If not, France should buy the fighter planes itself. So
Hollande gave in. Béraud-Sudreau states: “This
is a good indication of how arms exports are a crucial factor of the
French State's military budgeting; any shortfall in exports would end
up being paid by the taxpayer.”
Three
decades after the Cold War, the French arms export system still
exists. “Under the successive
presidencies of Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and François
Hollande the fundamental tenets of the policy were little changed –
and Emanuel Macron, so far, has steered a similar course,”
the author notes. Nevertheless, she sees the
French arms export policy to be changing. Military industrial
cooperation in Europe is expanding since last year supported by the
European Defense Fund. Until now, France has always blamed Germany
for disagreements over arms exports, but one could also argue that
“France's inflexibility”
and “lack of
political debate on arms sales” are
obstacles to further cooperation with Germany, writes
Béraud-Sudreau.
In addition to more active control, the
writer advocates more cooperation with European partners. There are
also calls for cooperation from the military industry itself.
Recently
Lorenzo Mariani, CEO of MBDA Italia (MBDA is
the European
missile manufacturer) stated : “No
country or company has the capacity or economic power to deal with
new technologies: collaboration, especially at European level, is a
fundamental element, and the European Defense Fund will play an
important role.” Better coordination
is especially necessary in cross-border military-industrial
cooperation. Which way this will go, towards the traditional French
arms export promotion or towards the Northwest European tighter
control, will be determined by politics.
Béraud-Sudreau
points to the paradoxical situation that while French organizations
were advocating for the ATT, control in France itself was on the
decline. The French NGOs were mainly engaged in international
campaigns for the ATT and did not follow concrete domestic policies.
Their limited resources prevented them from targeting both. The
French government's view on the European Code of Conduct on Arms
Exports was not that it was intended to make arms deliveries subject
to conditions, the author argues, but rather a means of creating a
level playing field in Europe in arms exports. In addition, the
European Intra Community Transfers (ICT) directive to simplify
military exports within the European Union led to a decrease in
French controls; from layered control to one-step control. The French
chose to use the system not only for intra-European, but also for
export to destinations outside Europe.
In the Netherlands,
politicians of the
VVD argued in favor of abandoning a strict Dutch application of
the EU arms export guidelines, because it is unfair as France does
what it feels like and will be soon followed by Germany. France is
used to sell a race to the bottom politics. It shows that what
happens in France is important also for policies in other EU member
states. In this book, packed with facts and analyses, Béreau-Sudreau
indicates that France may be heading for a more mature arms export
policy. Maybe not in the first place for ethical or moral reasons,
but because cooperation with other parties in Europe makes this
necessary. That the French opposition for an ethical arms export
policy is growing, is an inspiration.
See also: Parliamentary
oversight of arms exportshaving an impact,
a report by The Observatoire des armements.
* Lucie Béraud-Sudreau became director Arms
and Military Expenditures Programme of SIPRI in February 2020 and
argues for
strengtened cooperation of Europe's military industry.
Blog written voor Stop Wapenhandel
Nederlandstalige en uitgebreidere versie hier.
