Posts tonen met het label Dutch. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label Dutch. Alle posts tonen

donderdag 18 augustus 2016

Long road to arms exports transparency, the Dutch case

Last month the Dutch Government published its annual report on arms exports. We tend to think this kind of transparency is normal in the EU, but twenty years ago there was not such a thing as government public information on arms exports. Most information was secret; until 1998 in the Netherlands only total figures were given, divided in exports to NATO and to non-NATO countries. But transparency on arms exports developed quickly since the late nineties. In 1997, a confidential list with destinations of Dutch arms sales became public by a leak to the press. In 1998 a report on 1997 arms exports is the first to become officially public and a big step is made towards greater transparency. Since then, the Dutch government made a successful catch-up effort; Dutch government information on arms exports belongs to the most transparent of the world.

The most recent annual report, of July 2016, includes a page on export denials. These are arms export permit requests which are refused by the Dutch government. Remarkable is that eight out of thirteen blocked deals were for destinations on the Arabian peninsular; the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. All except one are based on criterion 2 of the EU Common Position on arms export; the respect of human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law. One denial is motivated by criterion 4; the preservation of regional peace, security and stability. The publication of these denials is detailed and informative (see table 3 at the end of this blog).

Beside the publication of an annual arms export report, the government publishes other information enhancing the insight in Dutch arms trade, an overview is provided in table 1. The different forms of reporting are described, explained or commented below.

Monthly reports

Around the same time that arms export figures were leaked, campaigners brought forward the Swedish example of government reporting on arms exports which was advanced at the time. Another step followed after a Freedom of Information Act request by Stop Wapenhandel and VPROs radio programme Argos asking for all governmental papers concerning arms trade. This request was answered with abundant information on individual military licenses in the nineties, although without names of specific types and companies. This was much more information that even Members of Parliament ever received. As a response, parliamentarians demanded the same level of information. All this undoubtedly helped to convince the government that transparency on arms export was no threat to trade. Space also existed because of greater openness after the Cold War. In 2004, a first report with individual licenses per month was published, giving a description, type of license, country of origin and end use and value. The format of monthly reports is by now also used for dual use and arms transit, all to be found on the website of the Dutch government and Stop Wapenhandel. It is the most informative – very factual - part of the transparency on Dutch arms exports. Lacking is information on type of end user (police, armed forces, industry) and the kind of license (individual, global or general) Both types of information could be easily included. An important – from political point of view – continuing omission is that publication is always long overdue.

Annual reports

Currently the Government is required to report several times on arms exports every year. The largest and most elaborate publication is the previously mentioned annual report on Dutch arms exports. This year for the first time since 2011 the annual report will also be published in English, which can help to work towards European harmonisation of arms export policy, an explicit wish of the Dutch government. The annual report is always commented by Stop Wapenhandel in an extensive critical analysis (coming forward later this year).

The report contains information on a) the defence and security industry, b) instruments and policy, c) the principles of the Dutch arms trade policy, d) transparency and e) the exports in the year it describes, EU-cooperation, information on the Wassenaar agreement, export control and dual-use and arms control. Those general chapters are largely copy and paste every year with minimal changes. Although this year the result of a new survey on the Dutch defence industry is included, giving the latest figures (see table 2)

The second half of the report is the most interesting, because it gives the amount, type and destination of Dutch exports and transit of military goods (and on dual use and transit in the previous calender year). This information is given in two different kind of tables: on country of destination and on category of weapon system. Both sorts of information are given in two half year tables and one on the full year, this because the Parliament is supposed to be informed every six months (which did not happen since 2012 however). It also gives an overview of Parliamentary documents on arms trade control.

Surplus

The Dutch government itself is a major arms exporter; a four column table on the contracts of surplus arms is included in the annual report (type of materiel, sent to, country of end use, end user). This table is also detailed and provides valuable information. In the report on 2015 this table was 30 entries long and the contracts had a total value of ca. € 20.5 million, 2.5 percent of the total. That is low compared to previous years. In 2014 it was 20 percent of all exports and in 2013 12 percent. Fluctuations are big, but Dutch surplus arms exports are important to monitor and often subject to debate. Dutch surplus armoured vehicles were seen during the quelling of uprisings in Egypt and Bahrain in 2011, and Dutch surplus arms have been used in the war on Yemen. Destinations for superfluous Dutch arms raised several debates in the parliament, e.g. on tanks to Indonesia and trucks to Sudan.

Written information on surplus arms, two weeks before an export license, was provided to parliament to enable it to better control the government in its double role of merchant and arms export controlling authority at the same time. The initiative for this came from Theo van den Doel (VVD) in 1997. The information was confidential although sporadically leaked like when in July 2007 a sale was made public of several types of military vehicles to Chile. With an export of frigates to Belgium something went wrong; the parliament was informed during a debate and not, as was intended, with a letter. In this debate the government explained its policy on confidentiality. Surplus sales could be made public only when there was not a financial reason or request by the client to keep them secret. It seems both criteria are never met, because a public letter on the export of surplus arms under € 2 million is never published since 2007. A curious situation: only the parliament is informed on small deals and parliament and public are both informed on large deals due to the rule that deals above € 2 million are public. Unknown however is if the parliament is really informed on all smaller surplus deals.

Deals larger than € 2 million

Noteworthy is a list of fast track notifications on export licenses larger than € 2,000,000. This part of the transparency policy has been introduced after three years of debates. In December 2009 Van Dam (PvdA) and Van Velzen (SP) tabled a motion to urge for a policy of transparency by publishing all planned arms exports of a value of more than one million euros three weeks in advance of a export permit decision. The majority voted against and the motion was rejected. During the arms trade debate of 2011, the Secretary of Economics, Bleker, proposed to inform the Parliament (confidentially if considered necessary) on definitive export permits for complete systems bigger than € 5 million for non EU or NATO+ destinations, two weeks after permit. Some parliamentarians considered the five million threshold as too high and amended in December 2011 by a motion to lower it to € 2 million under the same conditions. This was accepted. The resulting letters give information on the type of weapon, the country of destination and the criteria the government had considered before coming to conclusion. In 2015 the Parliament was informed in five and 2016 until now in one case. Two of the 2015 reporting letters were on exports to Jordan. This raises questions about criterion 2, as Jordan is part of the coalition waging war in Yemen (see previous blog) which was reason for many other denials in the same year.

Despite the enormous growth of government transparency not all information, even on major exports, is yet know. For larger deals of components other sources are still needed to understand Dutch arms export policy. What is exported to Venezuela in 2015 valued € 20 million? According to the SIPRI arms supplies data base the deliverances to Venezuela might be fire control and search radar for large patrol vessels or even technology or knowledge to built the ships itself. But to be sure, government information is needed.

Improvements can be made with the reintroduction of an English language annual report and restart of the publication of half year reports; the introduction of type of end user and the kind of license in the monthly reports; and clarification if the MPs are informed on surplus deals and why this happens always in secret.


MB August 2016
Written for Stop Wapenhandel

maandag 14 april 2014

No problem with arms sales to Qatar?

At the closing ceremonies of the DIMDEX Arms Fair Qatar announced arms acquisitions valued at €17 billion ($23 bn.).  This is more than twice the total Dutch annual military budget. Amongst others, the deal includes attack helicopters, guided missiles, tanker planes and naval vessels. Different segments of the orders have a Dutch component. The arms race on the Arabian peninsular has a new player.

On the picture: Patriot PAC-3 being fired.
Qatar is providing political support and weapons to islamists in several internal conflicts in the Middle East, such as in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Nusra in Syria has recently created a rift in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

But because of its missile defence capabilities close to Iran, the presence of a US-UK air force base and its rejection of Iran's influence in the region, Qatar is a partner of the West. The arms acquisition plans of the Emirate are part of the military ambitions of the Gulf State to become a stronger player in the Arabian world, on par with its growing soft power influence. Qatar is also the country where Al Jazeera is based.

Amongst others, Qatar wants to buy 22 NH-90 military helicopters from the NH Industries division of European aerospace group Airbus (formerly EADS), worth €2 billion. The Airbus' head offices are located in the Netherlands for tax reasons, but although the Netherlands provides its tax heaven facilities, it has no obligations to control the companies' arms export policies. A win-win situation for Airbus and the Dutch State treasury. Dutch aircraft company Stork Fokker is participating for 5.5% in NH Industries and thus will profit considerably from the Qatar deal.

Another part of the deal is the sale of over €1.5 billion in Patriot missile defence system equipment made by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. Dutch Fokker Aerostructures “is one of the suppliers for materials of the Lockheed Martin (LMMFC) – PAC-3-program, which is a military program.”

The deal also shows the growing footprint of Dutch shipbuilder Damen in Qatar. At DIMDEX Nakilat Damen Shipyards Qatar signed two Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the Qatar Armed Forces to build seven military vessels. “The vessels are highly sophisticated state-of-the-art naval ships based on proven designs providing unparalleled seaworthiness. (...) A large Integrated Logistic Support package is also mentioned in the MoUs” according to the Damen website. NDSQ is a joint venture between Nakilat and Dutch shipbuilder. The Dutch extreme islamophobic political party PVV asked Parliamentary questions on the deal. According to Minister for Trade and Development Ploumen, the deal is in line with Dutch export policies.

All Dutch and international arms control codes, regulations and treaties of the past forty years included regional security, regions of tension and human rights as criteria to measure and refuse arms sales. It seems Qatar is a highly qualified applicant for all three of them. Moreover, because Qatar is notorious for selling its arms to other conflict regions, at least the question has to answered how the end use of the exported equipment will be monitored. According to minister Ploumen:  “When transfers of knowledge take place the Dutch arms export policy offers enough guaranties against undesired effects.” In the case of Qatar, a more concrete and detailed description of these guarantees is no luxury.

Written for Campagne tegen Wapenhandel In Dutch Broekstukken or Sargasso.

vrijdag 21 maart 2014

Military exercises and arms


In recent weeks, the U.S. Africa Command annual regional exercise and operation Flintlock took place. Thousand of soldiers from eighteen countries cooperated in this international event for Special Forces. This year the aim of the exercise was to strengthen the position of the participating countries in two North African regions : the southern border region of Libya and the border region of Nigeria. Both are important for arms trafficking and in both areas Islamic terrorists are operating. Of the eighteen participating countries, nine were from West Africa (see map) and nine from Western Europe and North America.

The African participants were Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. Several of these countries struggle with internal conflicts. In Mali, Dutch troops will participate in the UN peacekeeping force MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) to collect intelligence. In Senegal, Special Forces are fighting already for decades against an independence uprising in the southern province Casamance. According to Dutch defence bi-weekly Defensiekrant, the Dutch and the Senegalese troops are special partners during Flintlock. Another participant, Nigeria, which often leads African Union peacekeeping missions, has a military with a domestic problem with human rights, to put it mildly.

Flintlock has implications for the arms market. Military cooperation increases the ability to sell arms. While you exercise, you acquaint with the military leadership and developed contacts that pave the way for commercial contacts. Because of the common struggle against the jihadists, even the poorest countries of North Africa have become arms markets for the West. The purchase by Mauritania, one of the poorest countries in the world, of an undisclosed number of Augusta/Westland helicopters, may serve as an example .

Military cooperation can also follow arms sales. The Netherlands cooperates "with countries for preservation, exports and sales of surplus equipment, e.g. Chile, Estonia, Finland, Jordan, Morocco, Vietnam and South Korea," reported Minister Hennis to the Dutch parliament.

The main buyer of Dutch weapons in North Africa, Morocco is also participating in Flintlock. Morocco takes a fifth position in a ranking of customers for Dutch weapons, with over half a billion euro of military sales to Rabat over the last ten years. Only at position 37 is the second North African country, Algeria. In 2013, this country bought arms valued 34 million euro's.

West Africa is not the only remarkable training area for the Dutch military. According to an overview recently sent to the Parliament by Minister of Defence Hennis, Dutch troops also find partners for exercises, education and training in e.g. Gabon and Peru (jungle training opportunities) and in Jordan and Israel (training facilities for Special Forces).

Martin Broek 10/03/2014
Written for Campagne tegen Wapenhandel
Dutch version of this blog

vrijdag 11 februari 2011

The Dutch and the War on Terror … in Africa

The Netherlands does not only send police trainers to Afghanistan, but also military trainers to Africa, defence periodical Jane’s Defence Weekly reports. The mission covers a territory larger than Western Europe. It is part of an exercise and operation that takes place in Algeria, Chad and Senegal, to name a few. The training will focus on fighting illegal arms trade, smuggling and human trafficking, according to Jane’s. So many positive goals in one sentence calls for some skepticism. Especially when we realize what kind of troops involved.


The exercise is named Flintlock. Flintlock is also the term for an igniter for small arms. Not really a name for an operation tackling illegal arms trade. And so that's not really what it is. Flintlock is a permanent activity in the framework of the American war against the terrorism (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF). It is organized around the Special Forces, the US troops best equipped and trained for heavy fighting in small and independent groups and for almost surgical individual operations for collecting information, or killing individuals.

Flintlock is an exercise operation established and coordinated through the US Joint Special Operations Task Force - Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS). It is not solely focused on training, but it is a multinational military activity of which training allies is an aspect. Already in 2005, 700 American Special Forces trained 2,100 badly armed soldiers from North and West-African countries, under the name Flintlock. The Netherlands is involved since that time.

Connected to Flintlock, a permanent Multinational Co-ordination Center (MCC) created to streamline the counter-terrorism activities in Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Chad. When asked, the Dutch ministry of Defence affirmed a few dozen Dutch marines and commando troopers are in Senegal, Chad and Burkina Faso from mid January until half March 2011. They will practice Special Forces operations with forces from those three countries and a number of other European and African countries. Which other countries will participate the ministry of Defence does not want to tell: "Not all countries want to make that public."

Last year the Dutch weekly military paper, the Defensiekrant, interviewed four Dutch soldiers that took part in Flintlock: Emiel of the army, Rob of the marines and the commandos Eric and Tom. They all said they were eager to return. Rob on Senegal: "You can hike sixty kilometers from the coast into the country, straight through the mangroves. Fantastic!" The largest mangrove area of Senegal lies in the Casamance. In this southern part of Senegal a small armed independency movement is active. In December last year seven Senegalese soldiers died during a clash, Radio France Internationale reported. The training provided will thus be welcomed by the Senegalese. For arms trade EU criteria exist to measure the effect of trade on human rights, security and development. How about comparable rules for providing training in regions of tension or with high risk of human rights violations? A question which should be asked in parliament.

A high ranked Dutch military, Major General Tom Middendorp, last year watched the operations and came also back enthusiastically. "The particulars of this formula is that you not only train African troops, but also conduct cross training with the participating countries under heavy circumstances. Many goals in one go. Formerly we sent observers only, now we joined with some troops. To me this seems something to repeat," the Defensiekrant quoted the general. Half a year later this is exactly what happens.

For the United States Flintlock is an operation in the framework of the fight against terrorism. US officer John Williamson, responsible for organizing Flintlock, is glad with the Dutch contribution. He says in a press explanation of JSOTF: "(…) the increased participation of our European SOF partners such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain in tactical training and MCC activities, underscores the importance of our desire for an international approach toward trans-border terrorist threats."

The Netherlands is regarding Flintlock as an exercise during which Special Forces train others and themselves, according to the Dutch ministry of Defence. It is not seen as an operation. This is despite the fact the US regards it as such and although there is a permanent command structure. But the semantics around the participation clearly shows the Netherlands are involved in the War on Terror or Operation Enduring Freedom on more than one front. Not only in Afghanistan, as is easily forgotten because of all attention for the new deployment in Kunduz.

Martin Broek

(edited by Frank van Schaik)

Sources:
* Zapatero ofrece a EE UU aumentar su presencia militar en España [Zapatero offered to increase U.S. military presence in Spain], Ignacio Cembrero, El Pais, Madrid December 7, 2010.
* Training in Trans-Sahara Africa, Max R. Blumenfeld, JSOTF-TS Public Affairs, GAO, Mali, December 13, 2010.
* Flintlock 2010 traint Afrikaanse troepen in Special Forces-operaties [Flintlock 2010 trains African troops for Special Forces operations], Defensiekrant no. 26, July 8, 2010.
* Spain joins anti-insurgency exercises, Jane's Defence Weekly, February 2nd, 2011.

woensdag 2 februari 2011

The Netherlands important supplier of Egypt’s arms

The authoritarian regime of Mubarak was armed mainly by the US. But also arms sales from the Netherlands are bigger than one would expect. The sale of armoured personnel carriers (a small kind of tanks) during the mid nineties is still one of the biggest sales in the history of Dutch arms trade.



In 1994 the Netherlands sold 599 YPR-765 and 12 M-577 tracked armoured vehicles. In 2005 a next sale of 431 YPR’s followed. The Dutch government defended this last sale by stating “that since 1994, as far as is known, Egypt used neither military equipment nor the armed forces against civilians.”

Follow-on deliverances continue as can be seen in information published by the Dutch government on arms sales. In a December 209 spreadsheet is a sale for armoured vehicle technology valued over one million euro’s (see table 2).

The deliverances are significant, not only because of their size, but also because of the potential use of this kind of weaponsystem during teh repression of popular protests. Small arms in the end do not convince really angry and desperate people. The bullets are taken as an inescapable part of the protests. That’s horrible, but the cruel reality. When armoured vehicles – in case of the Dutch ones also fitted with 25mm cannons – are deployed the military crew is invulnerable, but the protester defenceless and a easy prey.

In Cairo, until now luckily it is a different story with the army on neither side and waiting its chances. Before it was even seen on the side of the opposition: "(...) their displays of support for the protesters were conspicuous throughout the capital. In one striking example, four armoured military vehicles moved at the front of a crowd of thousands of protesters in a pitched battle against the Egyptian security police defending the Interior Ministry."

The Netherlands sold more arms to Cairo like technology to produce night vision goggles. But the sale of the armoured vehicles remains the most important, although neglected by the press. If they will be or will not deployed against the masses protesting lies in the future. Let’s hope not.

Martin Broek


Original in Dutch: http://broekstukken.blogspot.com/2011/01/nederland-belangrijke-leverancier.html
More on Dutch arms export to Egypt: http://broekstukken.blogspot.com/2011/01/wapenexporten.html


Table 1: armoured vehicles Egypt Source: Military Balance 2010,
p. 248 For more information see: wiki/Modern_equipment_of_the_Egyptian_Army

Note: Armoured vehicles are easy
recognised by shape, tracked or wheeled and the number of wheels.
Pictures can be found on the internet.


412


Reconnaissance


300


 


112


Commando Scout


610


Armoured Infantry

Fighting vehicle (AIFV)


220


BMP-1 (in store)


390


YPR-765 (met 25mm)


4.160


Armoured personnel carrier (APC)




 




 


2.600


APC (tracked) M-113A2


(500)  


BTR-50/OT-62 (most in store)


1.560


APC (wheeled)




250

 

250

 

 

410

 

650


BMP-600P


  BTR-60


  Fahd-30/TH 390 Fahd


  Walid




Table 2:  Arms
sales Egypt 2008-2009


 

Date


 

equipment


 

Final destination


 

origin


 

value

(€)


 

18-12-2009


 

Parts of YPR- and M113 APC armoured vehicles


 

EGYPT


 

Unknown


 

1.202.476


 

februari-2009


 

Technology 
to produce night vision goggles


 

EGYPT


 

Nederland


 

250.000


 

februari-2009


 

Technology and services for radar and fire
control equipment


 

EGYPT


 

Nederland


 

2.547.550


 

19-02-2009


 

Optical passive sight and assessors
(temporarily or retour after repair)


 

EGYPT


 

Nederland


 

20.000


 

23-03-2009


 

Technology and services for radar and fire
control equipment  (temporarily
or retour after repair)


 

EGYPT


 

Nederland


 

274.000


 

19-10-2009


 

Parts of fire control radar (temporarily or
retour after repair)


 

Egypt


 

Nederland


 

114.000


 

27-10-2009


 

Parts and software for  C3-consoles


 

Egypt


 

Nederland


 

4.010.932


 

nov-2009


 

Parts and assessors of fire control radar


 

Egypt


 

Nederland


 

295.000


 

13-02-2008


 

Technology 
to produce night vision goggles


 

Egypt


 

 Netherlands


 

50.000


 

31-07-2008


 

Parts of fire control radar


 

Egypt


 

Unknown


 

69.150


 

October 2008


 

Parts for C3-consoles


 

Egypt


 

Nederland


 

14.644.151


 

november-2008


 

Night vision camera’s


 

Egypt


 

Nederland


 

720.000


 

25-11-2008


 

Parts of radar fire control (permission period
extended)


 

Egypt


 

Nederland


 

295.000


Source: several reports on Dutch exports per month,
the Ministry of Economics. See: stopwapenhandel.org/(...)/overheid.html