Myanmar buys botched obsolete microwave radar / koopt opgelapte ouderwetse magnetronradar

De Ministers Ploumen en Koenders beantwoordden op vrijdag 18 september Kamervragen van Jasper van Dijk (SP) die werden gesteld naar aanleiding van een tekst van Stop Wapenhandel dat ik in juli schreef: Despite military embargo, India sells Dutch radar technology to Myanmar. 

Opmerkelijk is dat in een van de antwoorden staat dat het niet uit maakt of wapens oud dan wel nieuw zijn bij de beoordeling of ze onder het wapenembargo naar Myanmar/Birma vallen. Tegelijkertijd wordt gesteld dat het bij de levering gaat om een radar gebaseerd op verouderde technologie uit Nederland. Dus is het nu wel of niet toegestaan om oud cq. verouderd materieel te leveren? Oud of niet de waarde van het systeem is toch nog zo'n € 8 miljoen.

De laatste levering van de LW04 = RAWL02 Mk II vond plaats voor schepen waarvan het laatste in 2000 in de vaart werd genomen. 

Myanmar buys botched obsolete microwave radar

The Dutch Ministers Ploumen (Trade) and Koenders (Foreign Affairs) Friday, September 18th answered parliamentary questions from Jasper van Dijk (SP) that were asked in response to a text I wrote in July for Stop Wapenhandel: Despite military embargo, India sells Dutch radar technology to Myanmar. 

It is remarkable that one of the answers is that it does not matter if weapons are old or new when assessing whether they are covered by the arms embargo to Myanmar / Burma. At the same time it is stated in the questions that the sale is about radar based on obsolete modernised technology from the sixties. So is permitted or not to sell old or obsolete military systems to a country under an all inclusive arms embargo? Oldfashioned or not, the value of the system is still approximately 8 million.

Last deliverance of LW04 (Indian designation RAWL02 Mk II) for vessel launched in 2000.  

Despite military embargo, India sells Dutch radar technology to Myanmar

An arms embargo is the strongest measure of arms control. And thus must be taken very seriously. In 2013, Stop Wapenhandel published on its website about a possible breach of the embargo against Myanmar by re-export of Dutch defence technology from Thales through the Indian company Bharat Electronics (BEL). Defence company Thales responded immediately by proving that it had explained to BEL its objection to the delivery, as this would breach the EU arms embargo against that country. Based on information from an Indian defence website however, we know that military radar technology originating in the Netherlands is still exported to Myanmar despite an European Union embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment, which is including all military technology and will be in force at least until 30 April 2016.

It is high time to clarify how military equipment, built on a Thales Nederland license, can be sold to embargoed Myanmar. Thales is extending its relations with India and more navy ships with of the same kind of technology will be built. How is arms export regulations applied to re-export of Dutch technology on Indian built ships and what is the authority of the Dutch government?

The military technology in case are systems from Indian defence company Bharat Electronics, meant for six to eight Aung Zeya-class/Kyan Sittha-class guided weapon frigates which Myanmar is building domestically with Chinese help. India is delivering also other technology for these vessels. The ships cost approximately € 175 million. With Chinese help Myanmar is quickly developing a blue water navy, a navy with the potential to operate outside its own coastal waters.

The frigates are fitted with a range of weapons and weapon systems including radar produced by Indian firm Bharat Electronics (BEL), the so-called RAWL02 Mk III military early warning air radar. However Thales itself informed BEL March 2013 that it estimated the chance for the grant of an export license – of the deliverance of this radar built on a license of Thales Nederland - below twenty per cent, even when the EU arms embargo would be lifted. Thales warned BEL not to deliver and thus prevented the sale of this state-of-the-art radar to Myanmar.

Shortly after this however, Scoop.it reported that: “(frigate) Aung Zeya (pennant number F11), is fitted with what appears to be an older variant of the RAWL.” In some sources this radar is still wrongly identified as the 3rd generation radar.

So, Bharat did sell radars to Myanmar. Not the ones Thales told them not to deliver, but an older version of the same radar, the RAWL02mkII instead of RAWL02mkIII. Expert sources which have been consulted by Stop Wapenhandel confirmed that this version is based on an ealier version of the LW-series. The mkIII version is based on the LW08, a long range radar of the 3rd generation and produced on a 100% license, according to a Thales email received June 26, 2015, and several are delivered to India. The major military handbooks underwrite the Dutch origin of the mkII variant. World Naval Weapon Systems (5th edition, p. 240) of the Naval Institute – independent but close to the US Navy – e.g. makes clear the majority of BEL's radar systems originates at Thales (Hollandse Signaal Apparaten, HSA). Thales confirmed in the email of June 26, 2015, that the radar delivered to Myanmar is based on LW04 technology of Thales Nederland. The LW-04 is the first one of the second generation long range air surveillance radars produced by Thales. In 1969 a license was provided by HSA to BEL to build the radar in India. BEL developed the radar into the RAWL02 MK IIAP/N-112110340676. This is advertised by BEL for its salient features and still in use by India as can be concluded by a manual for naval officers. Thales however states in an email of June 30, it is sixty years old and no new parts where deliverd. Although this is an old system, even the previous 1st generation LW03 radar system is still in use. There is also other HSA naval technology from that time presently equiping navies around the world, from Spain to Thailand and from Finland to Egypt or Argentine. It is not new, but also far from obsolete.

Moreover, military deliverances are prohibited by the embargo, new or old. And very clearly this is military technology. The RAWL02mkII is designed for use onboard large and medium naval ships for long range air warning and target detection. “He who sees the most, and sees it before anyone else does, has the advantage,” as Thales itself describes the use of the LW03. It is one of many projects between BEL and Thales Nederland (and its predecessors Hollandse Signaal Apparaten (HSA) and Thomson CSF). Bharat Electronics was largely set up by Signal, according to Stuart Slade, annalist on radar in military magazine Naval Forces. Thales itself states on this cooperation: “In the past, BEL built under license Flycatcher Mk1 Thales systems and naval radars LW04, DA08 and ZW06 and the system ground Reporter.”

The latest major development is a joint venture between the two companies, dedicated to the design, development, marketing, supply and support of civilian and defence radars for the Indian and global markets. That is exactly what is happening in the Myanmar deal.

Until recently, there has been a buzz about lifting of the arms embargo against Myanmar, because the position of opposition leader Aung Suu Kyi has been normalised and political reforms in Myanmar improved democratic rule. But this year the situation has been deteriorated fast. The fight against the Rohingya population in the west of Myanmar is the best documented example of erupting violence in the country, but there are also ongoing clashes between the Buddhist and Muslim populations. “The growing violence against the Muslim population is a tragic reminder that Myanmar is still far from fully relinquishing the problems stemming from decades of military rule,” states journalist Harrison Akins at the website of Al Jazeera. Because of the fighting, many Rohingya are fleeing the country. In the North, fighting between the army and ethnic Han Chinese forced tens of thousands of civilians to flee from the border region. An overview of armed conflict in Myanmar is outside the scope of this blog, but the picture is black. In June Indian commandos crossed over the border into Myanmar to strike separatist bases in retaliation against an ambush in Indian Manipur state early this month. The elections in June were won by the military.

In December 2014, Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs Koenders replied (see Parliament minutes, in Dutch) to questions by MP Van Dijk (SP) that no Thales technology has been used for the deliverance to Myanmar. According to the minister, anything delivered is developed by India itself. But he offered to look in further detail into the question. Unfortunately so far no MP used this offer to proceed with investigation into the role of Dutch technology in the Indian export to Myanmar.

Amerikaanse rechtbank over Fokker: 'Bedrijf met een lange geschiedenis van bedrog en illegaal gedrag'

Een Iraanse Aseman Airlines’ Fokker 100 op de luchthaven van Teheran, 2007

De schikking die Fokker Services vorig jaar trof met de Amerikaanse autoriteiten vanwege het leveren van vliegtuigonderdelen aan omstreden regimes was te mild, zo oordeelt de rechtbank in Washington.


In zijn juridische advies weigert de federale Amerikaanse rechter Richard Leon een schikking goed te keuren die Fokker Services, dochter van Fokker Technologies Holding BV, eerder heeft getroffen met de Amerikaanse regering. De Nederlandse fabrikant van vliegtuigonderdelen wordt door de Amerikaanse autoriteiten ervan beschuldigd in de periode 2005-2010 in totaal 1153 maal illegale transporten van vliegtuigonderdelen ter waarde van $ 21 miljoen te hebben uitgevoerd. Onder andere naar Iraanse klanten, waaronder het leger, alsmede aan Soedan en Birma die destijds onder een embargo vielen.

Fokker Services moet een bedrag van $ 10,5 miljoen strafboete betalen en een even grote som in de vorm van civielrechtelijke boete. Maar volgens rechter Leon was deze overeenkomst, daterend van juni 2014, veel te mild: ‘Door deze verdachte dermate krachteloos te vervolgen wordt het vertrouwen van het publiek in de rechtsgang ondermijnt en schendt het hun respect voor de wet’, schrijft hij. Leon verwijst met name naar de leveranties aan Iran om zijn woorden te onderstrepen.

Fokker heeft aan het onderzoek meegewerkt en toegezegd het leven te zullen beteren. De VS-regering liet de controle echter over aan het bedrijf zelf. ‘De DPA (Deferred Prosecution Agreement) vraagt in het geheel niet om een onafhankelijke waarnemer, noch naar het maken van periodieke verslagen voor dit Hof of de regering om na te gaan of Fokker de Amerikaanse wet naleeft’, stelt Leon, zijn ongemak kenbaar makend. ‘Je kunt je niet voorstellen hoe een bedrijf met zo’n lange staat van bedrog en illegaal gedrag het ministerie van Justitie heeft weten over te halen hiermee in te stemmen!’

  Afnemers werden verborgen gehouden

De feiten waarop de gerechtelijke weigering van de schikking is gebaseerd, zijn afkomstig van de Amerikaanse overheid. Daaruit blijkt dat Fokker Services staartnummers van vliegtuigen verborgen hield of vervalste om de nationaliteit van de afnemers te beschermen. Bestelde goederen werden op leugenachtige wijze besteld onder het mom van ‘voorraad’ waarmee voorkomen werd dat de klanten van Fokker in verband konden worden gebracht met door de VS gesanctioneerde landen.

Het Nederlandse bedrijf gaf haar personeel ook het advies om administratieve gegevens met betrekking tot Iran verborgen te houden voor de Amerikaanse functionarissen. Een deel van de verscheepte materialen kan de nationale veiligheid van de VS in gevaar brengen. Het exportcontrolebureau stelt dat Fokker Services de bestemmingen van de vrachten ‘systematisch’ heeft proberen te verbergen. In totaal gaat het om 253 overtredingen van de International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

Aanklager Machen stelt: ‘Fokker Services ziet de exportwetgeving van de VS als een ongemak waar ‘omheen gewerkt’ moet worden met list en bedrog.’ In 2008 werd Fokker er door de Nederlandse douane al voor gewaarschuwd dat zij niet in staat zou zijn om het bedrijf te verdedigen tegen het beleid van de VS ‘zodra het op problemen zou stuiten met de Amerikaanse autoriteiten rond de naleving van exportverplichtingen.’

Uiteindelijk is Fokker dus nauwelijks bestraft voor dit illegale gedrag. Fokker Services ontsloeg een directielid, veranderde wat taken van een deel van het personeel en zei toe haar personeel te zullen trainen in de Amerikaanse wetgeving inzake exportcontrole en economische sancties. Een cursus die bijvoorbeeld elk jaar wordt gegeven in Amsterdam.

De strenge straffen die de procureur had beloofd voor bedrijven die ‘winst maken uit het schenden en het omzeilen van de Amerikaanse handelswetgeving’ bleek slechts lippendienst. Fokker moest een boete betalen die niet hoger was dan de waarde van de illegale transacties. ‘Geen cent meer dan het zelf bijeenbracht heeft met illegale transacties’, stelt rechter Leon in zijn juridische advies. Fokker stelt ten onrechte dat het hier om door de pers verzonnen bedragen gaat, terwijl ze worden genoemd door de rechter.

  Militaire industriële schakel

De straf is zo licht, omdat zwaardere financiële sancties het bedrijf ernstig zouden hebben beschadigd en daarmee een onevenredig grote straf zou zijn geweest, stelt een betrokken wetshandhaver in de Washington Post. Wat er nu gaat gebeuren is onduidelijk. Rechter Leon staat open voor goedkeuring van een gewijzigde overeenkomst. Fokker heeft besloten in beroep te gaan.

Fokker is ook niet zomaar een bedrijf. Het maakt voor een belangrijk onderdeel uit van Nederlandse defensie-instellingen, en vormt een industriële schakel tussen de VS en de Nederlandse militaire markt. Dit verklaart wellicht het feit dat, ondanks de ernstige schendingen van de Amerikaanse exportwetgeving, de strafmaat zo minimaal is uitgevallen.

De term ‘Fokker’ levert met de zoeker op de website van het Amerikaanse ministerie van Defensie 351 resultaten op. Fokker neemt deel aan een aantal grote Amerikaanse wapenprogramma’s, zoals de F-16, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Chinook helikopters, Sea Sparrow en Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) raketschildraketten. Het bedrijf maakt actief deel uit van de Atlantische band tussen de VS en Nederland. In januari ondertekende het nog een contract met Lockheed Martin voor de fabricage van vleugelcomponenten voor de JSF.

In elk parlementair debat in de Tweede Kamer omtrent de uitvoer van wapens wordt op zijn minst eenmaal gezegd dat de onze wapenexportwetgeving prima in orde is en dat Nederlandse bedrijven zich gedragen volgens de wet. Bovenstaand verhaal laat zien hoe een groot Nederlandse defensiebedrijf met list een bedrog zijn producten uit de VS verhandelde. Een beetje meer professionele scepsis van de leden van het Nederlandse parlement zou op zijn plaats zijn.

Eind februari kondigde Fokker Elmo (ook een dochter van Fokker Technologies) aan dat het een joint venture met het Indiase bedrijf SASMOS HET Technologies Ltd. is aangegaan. India staat bekend om zijn corruptie binnen de wapenindustrie. Deel van de samenwerking is dat Fokker Elmo technologie voor export gaat overdragen aan haar Indiase partner. De vraag is of het eindgebruik daarvan serieus zal worden gecontroleerd, en of de Tweede Kamer dit kritisch zal volgen.

Geschreven voor Ravage-webzine
In English for Stop Wapenhandel

Fokker: “a company with a long track record of deceit and illegal behavior”

In his Opinion of February 5, 2015 U.S federal judge Richard Leon refused to approve a settlement for sanction violations by the Dutch aerospace firm Fokker Services, daughter of Fokker Technologies Holding B.V with the US Government. Fokker is a key Dutch defence company.
The company was accused of more than 1,100 illegal shipments worth $21 million to Iranian customers, including the military, and to embargoed customers in Sudan and Burma in the period 2005-2010. Fokker agreed to forfeit $10.5 million and pay a civil fine of $10.5 million as a settlement.

But according to judge Leon, this settlement, made in June last year, was too lenient: “It would undermine the public’s confidence in the administration of justice and promote disrespect for the law for it to see a defendant prosecuted so anaemically,” he wrote. He especially referred to the deliverances to Iran to underpin his words.

Fokker cooperated in the investigation and promised to better its life. The US-government left the verification of these promised improvements however to self-reporting of the company. “The [Deferred Prosecution Agreement] DPA does not call for an independent monitor, or for any periodic reports to be made to either this Court or the Government verifying the company’s compliance with U.S. Law” wrote judge Leon, making clear his discomfort: “One can only imagine how a company with such a long track record of deceit and illegal behaviour ever convinced the Department of Justice to agree to that!”

The facts which made judge Leon deny the settlement came from information filed by the US Government. According to these, Fokker Services withheld or falsified tail numbers of planes. Falsely indicated parts were presented as “stock parts” to conceal its customers' affiliations with U.S. sanctioned countries. The Dutch company deleted references to Iran in materials sent to US companies. Employees were directed to hide activities and documents relating to Iran from US officials. Etc. This policy was at least partly known and approved by the senior management of the Dutch aeronautic company.

US Attorney Machen said: “Fokker treated U.S. Export laws as inconveniences to be 'worked around' through deceit and trickery.” In 2008, Fokker had already been warned by Dutch customs that they would not be able to defend the company “if it encountered problems with United States authorities regarding export compliance.”

Although the Attorney gave lip service to strong punishment of companies seeking “profit from violating and circumventing US trade laws” in the end Fokker has hardly been punished. Fokker Services fired a president, reassigned the duties of some of its personnel and promised to train employees in US export controls and economic sanctions. A program which is e.g. available every year in Amsterdam. The company had to pay a fine which was only as high as the value of its illegal transactions, “not a penny more than the revenue it collected from its illegal transactions,” judge Leon stated in his Opinion. The statement by Fokker that the figures are “speculative assumptions and amounts, not based on facts” is clearly inadequate. According to the Washington Post, punishment was minimal because more massive financial penalties would have severely hurt the health of the company and would have been a disproportionate penalty for its conduct. What will happen now must be awaited. Judge Leon remains open to approving a modified plea agreement. Fokker itself decided to file a Notice of Appeal.

Fokker is not just any company. It is part of the Dutch defence establishment, and is strongly linking the US to the Dutch military market. This provides another logical explanation for the fact that, despite the severe violations of US export law, punishment was so minimal. When searching the website of the US Department of Defence on Fokker, one finds as many as 351 results. Fokker is participating in major US weapon programs, such as the F-16, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Chinook helicopters, Sea Sparrow and PAC-3 missiles, and is thus part of the Atlantic bond between the US and the Netherlands. In January, it signed its most recent public contract with Lockheed Martin on wing components for the Joint Strike Fighter. Thus a company to handle with prudence.

In any debate on arms exports in the Dutch Parliament it is at least stated once that Dutch arms exports are according to the rules and that Dutch companies are behaving according to the law. This story shows a major Dutch defence company using tricks an deceit to trade its products. A bit more professional scepticism on the side of the Dutch parliament according to the spotlessness of Dutch defence companies would be wiser.

Late February, Fokker Elmo (also a daughter of Fokker Technologies) announced to start to market defence products in a Joint Venture with the Indian company SASMOS HET Technologies Ltd. India is known for its endemic corruption in the defence business. And there is another issue at stake too. As part of the joint venture deal, Fokker Elmo will transfer technology to its Indian partner as and when required. The question is if the end use of this technology will be controlled seriously, and if the Dutch parliament will be critical enough to monitor this.

Written for Stop Wapenhandel

Nederlandstalige versie Ravage-webzine